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STRATEGIC CHOICES IN IS INFRASTRUCTURE: 
CORPORATE STANDARDS VERSUS 




William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration 
University of Rochester 
Abstract 
A key IS infrasaucture policy decision is wbelher to Jct each dcpartmem select its own "Best of Breed" system 
solutions, which may be incompatible with each other, or to mandaie th<! adoption or a uniform corporate standard, 
which may not be deemed suitable by some departments. Our paper examines tile salient trade-offs involved in 
making such critical decisions. We identify cases where installation or disparate systems is preferable from an overall 
corpa-ate perspective and those where all depanments arc required to adopt the same system. Tbe paper shows 
that: 
(I) If Ille organization requires all depanments to use Ille same standard system, then it is always better off 
delegating this choice of a particular standard to a negoliating process among the dq:,artments. 
(ii) In certain situations, lbe organization benefits by letting departments install different systems that are best suited 
10 their needs (Best of Breed). 
(iii) Site-licensing may adversely affect the adoption or a standard system as a result of a dysfunctional response 
which we tenn shadow-rider behavior: (lepanmems i1ti1ially mask their true preferences and do 1101 contribute 
to me purchase or site licenses, but later try and switch to gain cheap usage or the system once it is licensed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Organizations today have an unprecedented and wide choice of 
hardware and software systems for each business function, for 
instance, in large databases (IBM's 0B2 versus Oracle), 
engineering design software (HP's MEJO versus MicroSofl 
Windows-based VISIOTecbnical), basic architecture (open 
versus closed, mainframe versus client-server), personal 
computer hardware (PC versus Mac), communication systems 
(TCP/IP versus Novel !PX), operating systems (Windows NT 
versus osn Warp), word processing (WordPerfect versus 
MicroSoft Word), spreadsbectS (Lotus 1-2-3 versus MicroSoft 
ExceO, office suiies (MicroSoft Office versus Novell 
PerfectOffice), groupware (Lotus Notes ,'Cl'sus Share), e-mail 
(MicroSoft Mail versus cc:Mail), and presentation software 
(Aldus Persuasion versus PowerPoint). Given the observed 
increase in overall IT expenditures (Gurbaxani and Mendelson 
1987; Brynjolfsson ct al. 1994; Stuart 1994) Ille current trend 
of cross-functional integration arising from corporate 
n:cngineering and this increased variety, managers are looking 
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for ways to analyze systematically Ille implications of corporate 
technological policy choices. 
One of the prime considerations facing an organization making 
these choices is whether 10 allow users to pick systems that best 
meet their ~pecific requirements or 10 mandate a uniform 
coipora1e standard that is deemed best overall. Nwnerous articles 
in the trade literature provide IS managers with contradictory 
recommendations about the value of enforcing corporate 
standards: 
Our economic system rewards genius. and international 
standards committees are not renowned for that .... Tbe 
future will belong to proprietary systems created by 
entrepreneurs who refuse to be bound by logicians' 
schemes. These systems will encompass ideas and 
functions we can scarcely dream of and no standards 
architect can prepare for. 11:,ey will generate wealth that 
would make Bill Gares blush. [Prince 1993) 
-
Io contrast, other authors (Wredeo 1995) advocate the use of 
corpcnu:,-widesiandards that require c1epartmen1al managers 10 
put lhe corpora1e good ahead of departmenral or individual 
interests: "From an organizational standpoint, it can pay 10 get 
all depar1Joellls running on lhe same sui1e so infonnation can be 
shared more easily." 
These apparent contradictions may resul1 from lhe fact lhal the 
desirabilily of standards depends on various organizational and 
teehnological factors. Empirically, one observes that cenain 
corporations maodare strict IS standards while Olhers do not 
(Brewsier and DiPaulo 1995). 
Toe selection of a corporare standard. or of a commoo information 
teehnology, has imponant economic and organizational 
implications. This is illustrated by lhe following example, in 
which a maoufadllring finn evaluates the purchase of a 
comprehensive production process planning package. The 
engineering design department prefers to use lhe MEJO 
Compuier Aided Design system on Unix-based HP works1ations, 
while the production department prefers using VISIOTeclmical 
on MS Windows-hased PCS. The first system is perceived as a 
better IOOI for solid modeling and kinematic analysis, which are 
lhe key activities in engineering; lhe second has superior process 
planning and tool path generation capabilities that manufacturing 
values very higllly. Using these twO S)SlemS requires suppon and 
training for both HP (Unix) and PC (Windows) environments. 
Moreover, file transfers belweell these sysrems have to go lhrougll 
pre-and post-processing conversions of drawings since the 
internal represenration of geometric elements differ between most 
CAD systems (even when Ibey use lhe same geomeuic model). 
Toe organization may either require lhe two depanmeuts 10 use 
lhe same system or allow each department to use lhe system !hat 
it prefers. In the former case, the manufacturing firm is said to 
mandate a standard. while in lhe latter it is adopting the "Best of 
Breed" approach. The choice between lhese two approaches 
depends on a number of competing COSI factors. If the 
VISJOTechnical manufacrurer offers steep si1e licensing 
discounts, then i1 may be cheaper 10 buy many copies of 
VJSIOTtchnical ins1ead of fewer copies of lhe IWO differenl 
systems. Furlher, lhe organization may develop a beneficial 
partnership wilh the vendor of VIS/0Tec/1nical by which ii 
receives special suppon and early releases. On the down side, 
lhe choice of V/SIOTechnical will reduce lhe value of the 
software 10 lhe engineering depanment since it prefers MEJO. 
Training and suppon costs are reduced due to shared 
organizational learning and less variety in user systems. The 
support staff can become more familiar with lhe single s1andard 
s)$1Cttl and provide better help. A larger pool of users makes ii 
ea.\ier for them to support each olher and ii provides managemem 
with greater nexibility in employee scheduling and allocation. 
On the Olher hand, having 10 follow a mandated IS standard 
implies lhat users give up some decision rigllts; doing so may 
adversely affecl morale and productiviry. Moreover, users may 
fear that a corporate-wide standard will resull in a shift in power 
from individual depanmenrs 10 lhe entily picking the standard. 
1lle trade-offs in selecting corporate standards policy discussed 
above are modeled in the following sections. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Earlier studies have primarily focused on lhe evolution of 
standards in the marketplace. They ha,'C examined !lie influence 
of various factors on standardization and the benefits of standards 
(Bensen and Salouer 1994; David and Greenstein 1990; Farrel 
and Saloner 1986; Greens1ein 1992; Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
Corporart rt standards involve differenl trade-oils. A few 
au1hors have recently presen1ed examples highlighting lhe 
berdi1s of corporate IT s1andards and discussed administrative 
procedures for developing them (Aacb 1994; Gordon 1993). Our 
paper is the first 10 formula1e and rigorously examine lhe salient 
1rade-offs in mandating infrasrructure standards for corporate 
infonnation sys1erns. Some of !he factors thal affect the 
standardization policy have been examined by other IS 
researchers. These include software development (Banker ct al. 
1993), systems rnanagemenl (Bakos and Kemerer 1992) and 
organizational changes (Clemons. Reddi and Row 1993; 
Brynjolfsson cl al. 1994; Malone I 987; Gurbaxani and Whang 
1991). lnconrras1, v.'C provide a comprehensive framework for 
analyzing the value of oorpora1c standards using non-<:ooperative 
game 1heory with no informa1ion asynunerry. 
3. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
CORPORA TE STANDARDS 
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WedefineS<Jm: oftbe 1cnns and concepts before describing lhe 
model. Standards are a set of specifications 10 which every 
purchaser or developer or a system must adhere. Mos1 standards 
have evolved ovtt the )C2r5 in one of twO principal wa)S. De jurt 
srandards are mandated by regulatory bodies or governments. 
In conrrast, de facto s1andards arise when a number of entities 
coopera1e or form joinl associations to adopt standards 
volun1arily. We use the term system for specific hardware. 
software or communication equipmenl or a specific combina1ion 
of these; standard for the use of a common sys1em by various 
depanments; and infrastrueture for a set of basic installations and 
facilities such as hardware, software and communication systems. 
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Figure 1. Cost Structure ror the Two Departments 
We first develop a single-period framework of technology 
adoption. The framework considers two deparunents of an 
cxganization that may use different systems for their computing 
noeds.1 In M:ler to examine the evolution of voluntary standards, 
we assume that the departments operate as profit centers and tha1 
they pick the sysiem that is in their best imercst. We consider a 
Standard business transaction 10 be a documem preparation and 
exchange for simplicity. We do not assume that the deparunents 
will coordinate ex-ante, bul rather that any such coordination is 
10 be determined by the economics and policies of the 
departments and the corporation. In the following, the subscripi 
d refers to departments and the subscript / refers 10 systems. Each 
department can incur four major cost components: 
I. An acquisilion cosr. which represents the cost of purchasing. 
insialling and training the users in opera.ting the infonnation 
system and other one-time investments. Let F6 be the 
acquisition cost of department d acquiring system / (dolla,s). 
When two or more departments plan to use the same system, 
it can be centrally M:lered and purcllasing economies of scale 
arereali2.ed. 1bebcnclitsofjoi111 purchase include volume 
discounts, site-licensing discounts and other cost savings 
from processing a joint order. The savings due to joint 
purchase are shared proportionately. Let Wf. be this 
reduction in the acquisition cost of department d for system 
/ (0< w, < 1). When onedeparnncnt purchases a product 
previously acquired by some other departmeot (delayed 
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purchase), die acquisition cost incurred by that department 
may be lower due to previous rued investments already 
made by the organization. Let R,,F. be this reduction in 
acquisition cost of delayed purchase by depanment d for 
system/ (0 < R. < I). 
2. A unit docum1tlll processing cost, which represents the cost 
of processing a t)1)ical business document using the selected 
information system. This cost includes the cost of users' 
time in preparing the document and the cOSI of other 
resci.oro:s consumed in processing the document. Let c. be 
the unit document processing cost of department d when it 
uses system I (dolla,s per documem). 
3. A unit rranslatkm cost. which represents the cost of 
tranSlating and reformaning data of one business document 
from a foreign format 10 one accessible by tlie departmental 
system. This cost includes the cost of users' time in 
translating the document and the cost of other resources 
consumed in tl1is process. The magnitude of this cost 
depends on the degree of incompatibility across the various 
file structures and data formats in these information systems. 
Let T• be the unit translation costs of department d for 
converting documents to system / format (dollars per 
document). To simplify the analysis, we assume that the 
translation costs are borne by the department for documents 
that it receives in a foreign format.' The analysis can be 
easily extended for cases where depanmenlS incur translation 
costs based on documenis that they send and receive. 
Figure I shows the cost structure. 
4. A s..-ilching cos~ which represenis the cost of switching over 
from ooe system to another. when system choices are made 
aver time. This switching cost includes the cost of data and 
software con,-ersioo and the cost of retraining. Let s. be the 
switching cost for department d when it moves from another 
system to System / (dollars). 
Summary of Notation 
F,. System acquisition cost of depanment d for system / 
(dollars) 
C, Unit document processing cost incurred by department d 
when it uses system/ (dollars per document) 
X, Volume of documents processed by department d (number 
of documents) 
Y, Volume of documents received by department d from the 
other departmenis (number of documents) 
T • Unit translation cost for department d to convert documents 
from another system 10 the system / format (dollars per 
document) 
W; Percentage reduction in acgwsmon cos1 for system I 
resulting from joilll pure/lase 
R., Percentagereductioo in acquisition cos1 for department d for 
system/ resulting from delayed pure/Jase 
S,. Switching cost for departmem d when it moves from another 
system to system / (dollars) 
We consider a situation where two depanmenis, A and B, muSl 
purcbase a oew information system. Each department can choose 
either system I or system 2 10 meet its business needs. The 
managers of these two departments pick the systems 
indepeodeOlly. Since the depanmenlS may have different business 
missions, Ibey miglu prerer different systems. For specificity, let 
A pick system I and B pick system 2. A's (B's) costs include an 
acquisition cost F., (F.,), a processing cost C.,x. (C..,X8) , and 
a translation cost T., Y. {T81 Y 0). The costs for departments A 
and B for these choices and other choices are summarized in 
Table I. Toe costs incurred by departments A and B are 
separated bya comma. Table I represents the normal form of a 
single-stage game. 
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Table J . Summary of Costs for Departments A and B 
B picks System 1 B picks System 2 
A picks FA,+ c,..x" - w1F,..1• F.-.1+CAlXA+T..,,Y..,,. 
System I F11 + C,.X1 • W,F11 F., + c.,x,+ T.,Y. 
A picks r-Al ♦ CA2XA + T,uYN F,u + CA?XA- Wz.FAl~ 
System 2 F11 + C.,X, + T01 Y0 F., + C.,X8 - w,Fm 
3.1 Rise of IS Standards and 
Externality Effects 
If any one system is clearly superior to others. then both the 
departments wiU pick thal system and it will become the standald. 
We first look at the case when the departments, felt to themselves, 
make different choices. Given that the iwo departments make 
different choices, wiUIOUt loss of generality, assume tha1 A prefers 
system 1 and B prefers sys1em 2. Define TC.(i,j) 10 be the tl)IJI) 
cost 10 depanmeot d when A picks system I and B picks system 
j. Toe following total cost condition states when A will choose 
I if B picks 2: 
Rearranging the tenns in the above inequality, we get: 
(I) 
where a.,= (F Al. F.,) + (C., . c,,)x •. The term a., represents 
the preference of depart mem A for system I if it were tbe only 
depanmcni in 1he organi1.a1ion. The lef1-hand side or condiuon 
( 1) represents deparunent A ·s iflC()mpatibiliry costs, which arc 
Uie costs that A incurs when it picks a system different from that 
of B. They include translation cosls of converting documents 
received from B, represented by the term T., Y •· and tbe loss of 
economies of scale. represented by the term W ,F .,. Condition 
(I) stales Uiat department A will pick system 1 if itS preference, 
a., exceeds i1s incomparibility costs. This condition also swes 
why a con,-ergence 10 a commoo SlaDdard is more likely when the 
incompatibility costs increase, due to either increased urut 
1tansla1ion cost (e.g., due to the complexity of the exchanged 
documenis) or increased now of documents across depanments. 
lNge quanritydiscounlS also push toward a standard system. The 
direction or infonua1ion flow across departments also has a 
significant impact on the choice of information systems. If 
departments incur 1tanslalion costs for documents they receil'e, 
!hen a dcpartm.:m thal receives a lot of information is more likely 






A similar anal)Sis can be done for depamnent B • s preference ror 
system 2. The equation is given by 
T11Y8 + W,F11 ~ 8., (2) 
where 8a,= CF., • F.,) + (C •• • C8,)X1 represents the preference 
of B for syslelll 2 over system 1, aod the incompatibility costs 
imposed on B are given by T 81 Y 8 + W 1F8,. 
Now consider lhe welfare of the organi1;1tion as whole. Assume 
Iha! the costs are such that lhe unique outcome for the above game 
is ror the departments, left 10 themselves, to choose different 
S)SletllS.' Wilh<lut loss of generality, let this outcome be such that 
A picks s)Slem I and B picks system 2. Although these choices 
represent the least•C051 alternatives for each depanmen1, ii may 
not be the most cost-efficient choice for the organization as a 
"bole. The cost for the whole organization of picking disparat.e 
systems over a system-I standard is given by <1>1 = n::.(1,2) + 
n::,(1,2) • CTC.(1,1) + TC 8(1,l)), and the cor,esponding cost 
roras)&COl-2standard by<l>, = TC.(1,2)+ TC,.(1,2) · ('rC.(2,2) 
+ TI:1(2,2)). These may be rewriuen as: 
<1>1 =T.,Y. +W,F., - (881 - (T.,Y8 +W,F8 ,)) (3) 
<l>, =T.,Y, + W,F., · ca., -(T.,Y. + W,l',.,)) (4) 
The extemalily ccst is the cost that a department imposes on the 
other depanment by choosing a different system; this includes the 
translation cost and lost economies or scale. In expression (3), 
the term T"' Y. + W;F., represents l!v:.extemaliry rosts imposed 
on A by Bin its choice of a different system, and T82Y8 + W1F81 
represents the incompatibility costs of B. "The marginal cost of 
forcing a department 10 change its choice of a system is the 
difference between its preference for the system and its 
incompatibility costs. Expressions Cl), and <J? represent the 
organiuitional cost savings or the value of standards and are 
expressed as the difference between the extemality costs and the 
marginal costs or forcing a department 10 switch to a standard 
system. A standard will arise if <I>, or 'I! is positive, as the 
organi1;ition will prefer it over incompatible systems. The 
following proposition summarizes this idea. 
Proposition 1: f-rom an overall organizational standpoint, a 
department may be forced to reverse its original choice of 
information system, thereby conforming 10 a~ jure standard, if 
conditions (I) and (2) hold and either of <I>, or <I>, is positive. 
Proofs of all the propositions are given in our working paper 
(Dewan. Scidmann and Sundaresan 1995). These conditions sia1e 
that it is individually optimal for the rwo departments 10 select 
differem systems and ii may well be that the net organizational 
savings realized by converting 10 a standard exceed the costs 
imposed on a depar1men1 forced 10 reverse its original choice. 
Proposition 2: If ii is optimal 10 have an involuntary standard 
(conditions ofpropo6ition I), one of three situations may evolve: 
I. Departmem B moves from its system (system 2) to 
depanmenl A"s system(system I). Fonnally, <I>,> 0 and <1>1 
$ 0. 
2. Departmem A moves from its system (system I) 10 
depanmenl B's system (S)Slem 2). Formally, ct>, ~ 0 aod <l>, 
>0. 
3. Either one of the depanments adopts lhe other's system. 
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F-ormaUy, <l>, > 0 and <I>,> 0. 
Figure 2 illustrates the managerial implications of these rwo 
propositions. II shows die impact of the departments' individual 
preferences on dlcir evennaal choice of information systems. The 
positive direction of the horizo111al axis depicts A's preference 
for system I (8.,): the negative direction depicts A's preference 
for system 2 (8.,). Similarly, the vertical axis shows B's 
preferences (88,, 8a,). When neither department has a strong 
preference, a dual standard emerges; both departments are likely 
10 choose die same system volun1aril y. On the other hand, when 
both depanmems have Strong preferences. we wilness best of 
breed choices. When the deparanents" prcfaences are in conflict, 
it may be possible for the one with 1he StrOnger preference to 
persuade die other 10 adopt its system by providing a subsidy. 
The cross-hatched area in 1hc lower right quadrant illustrates 
these possibilities: a1 PI deparunen1 A will subsidize B's choice 
of system I, al P2 departmem B will subsidize A's choice of 
S)$!etll 2, and at P3 either cleparunenl will be willing 10 subsidize 
Slandanlization to eliminate its incompatibility costs. The length 
of the arrows ~manatingfrom these points represents the minimal 
subsidy provided 10 the departmem changing its original selection. 
11 is clear from Figure 2 and from Proposition 1 lhat the subsidies 
will be less than the subsidizing department's savings. These 
issues are funher studied in the following section. 
3.2 Subs idjzing Standard Choices 
We consider the problem of achieving the organizationally 
optimal standard. In sonie ca-res. even when it is organizalionall y 
optimal 10 have a standard. 1he departments may pick different 
systems. This occurs because the dcparunents ignore the 
ex1emali1ies in making choices. 
Best of 
Breed 
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Figure 2. Th• Pt-eference Space and Different Outcomes 
Consider the case when both depanmenis choosing syslCrn I is 
the socially optimal solution and lhe departmenis choose ditrerent 
systems (departrnem A picks system I and dcpanmem B picks 
S)SlClll2) when lbere is no coordination. Conditions (I) and (2) 
are satisfied, and <I>, > 0. The socially optimal result can be 
achieved by providing a subsidy to B to switch to system I. II is 
interesting to DOie lha1 the cost of lhe subsidy is smaller than the 
externalities because of significant incompatibility cosis. The 
minimal subsidy required by B is given by8., - (T.,Y 1 + W,F81). 
The sub5idy equals the preference of B for system 2 over I less 
iis own incompatibility costs. Since <I>, > 0, it can be seen from 
equatioo(3) tbatTA,YA + W,F,._, >(e.,-o·., Y 1 + W,F.,)). Even 
aflCr issuing the sub5idy, the organization can still auaio a 
savings oC<I>, over the uncoordinated result of different systems, 
as the savings in externality COStS imposed on A are greater lhan 
the subsidy to B. In this case, since A gelS the net savings, A will 
be prq>ared to provide the subsidy. This interesting phenomenon 
is highlighted by the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: In the two-system case, if it is optimal 10 have 
an involuntary standard, cross-subsidy among departmenlS is 
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sulliciem 10 guarantee the Standard choice for the depanments 
involvtd. 
The subsidy mechanism described above will result in a standard 
with which both the organization and Ille individual depanmenis 
are better off. The surplus of Ille departments and the 
organization is increased. Standardization can be acbieved by 
subsidizing just one depanment; Ulis subsidy may be provided 
by the corporation or by the other department.' 
As an e.xarnple, consider tile following situation. Departmenis 
A and B are 10 pick from I wo systems. ·me purchasing cosis of 
SyStems I and 2 are $1,000 and $200 respectively. Additional 
departments can be added to either syslCm at a cost of SI 00. The 
COSI ofjoim purd:Jases is shared. The unit documem processing 
costs for the systems are SO.OJ and SO. IO per document, 
respectively. Processing volumes vary significantly between 
departments A and B: department A processes 20,000 dOcuments, 
and departrncnt B processes only 2,000 documentS. In addition, 
tbedeparnnents transfer 1,000 documents between themselves, 
and each depanmem incurs a unit translation COSI of SO.Of for 
each document received in an incompatible format. The cOSls 
faced by lbe two departments for different choices are 
summarized in Table 2. The first entry in each cell represents the 
cost to department A and the second entry is the cOSI to 
department B. F<r instance, when A picks system I and B picks 
s)Slem2, the cost to A is $1,210. This comprises the purchasing 
cost of Sl,000 for system I, a processing cost of S200 and a 
translation cost of SIO. For B, the total cost is S4l0, consisting 
of the purchase cost of S200 for system 2, a processing cost of 
S200, and a lraDSJation cost of SlO. Wbcn both departments pick 
system I, they share the joint purchase cost of SI, I 00 for 
system I, resulting in a total cost of $750 10 A, comprising a 
purdlasecost of S550 and a processing cost of S200 and a total 
COS( of $570 10 B, comprising a purchase COS( of S550 and a 
processing cost of $20. Costs for other choices are similarly 
derived. 
Table 2. Summary of Costs 
B picks system I B picks system 2 
A picks I 750,570 1210, 410 
A picks2 2210, 1030 2150, 350 
The choice of s)Slem I by A and system 2 by B is the only Nash 
equilibrium in this game. That is, if A picks system I, B finds it 
optimal 10 pick system 2, and vice-versa. Do note, however, that 
the organization, which incurs the sum of the individual 
department's costs, prefers that they botb pick system I; this 
choice gives the minimum organizational cost of $1,320, which 
is $300 less than the cost of non-cooperative choices. 
Department A also prefers this outcome. In fact, if A provides 
a subsidy of S160. then B also picks system I and A ends up 
saving $300 even after the subsidy. N01e that if the organization 
mandates system 2 as standard, the overall cost of $2,500 is 
higher than the total cost of Sl,320 achieved by the subsidy 
mecbanism. The imponant implieation of tbi.~ result is that, when 
the orgartization wishes all users to conform to a common 
standard. letting the users choose the particular standard through 
a negOliating process among themselves is superior 10 imposing 
a management-mandated standard. 
Figure 3 addresses the impact of processing volume changes on 
the departmental choices, when the number of documents 
received by a department grows in proponion to the Olher 
deparanent's processing volume. The lines in the figure 
demarcate areas in which the choice of systems by the 
depanroents changes and these choices are indicated within each 
region. The figure shows that the Optimal choices cons1i1u1e 
closely connected sets. Clearly, the processing volume of botb 
clepanmeots has a significant effect upon the their willingness to 
standardize and their choice of information system. As volume 
increases for both deparunents, System I, with its lower 
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processing cost, becomes preferable as a standard. When volume 
is very low for both departments, System 2's lower acquisition 
cost outweighs its higher processing costs. The best of breed 
solutions will be optimal when there is a great disparity in 
processing volumes. 
3.3 Best of Breed Solutions 
It may not be d1e case that a single standard is the best for the 
organization under all conditions. Departments with different 
business missions may prefer different information systems. If 
the intcr-<lepanmemal communication volume is 001 significant, 
the incompatibility and ex1ernali1y costs will be small and a " Best 
of Breed" solution may also be organizationally optimal. For 
example, when conditions (I) and (2) are satisfied, <I>, < 0 and 
<t>, < 0, the preference of the departments for their chosen system 
exceeds the incompatibility and externality costs. Funher, "Best 
of Breed" solutions may be preferred in environments with rapid 
dcvclopn~m and 1echnological uncenainty. This variety provides 
a hedge when there is incomplete infonnalion. 
4. IMPLICATIONS OF SITE LICENSING 
ON SYSTEM CHOICE 
4.1 Shadow-Rider Behavior 
Cost-sharing of joint purchase and site licensing policies in an 
organization can result in non-cooperative gaming behavior by 
the dcparunents by which the organization suffers a dead-weight 
loss. This is illustrated by the example below. 
('.on.~ider a case where departments A and B have a choice of two 
systems. Systems I and 2 COSI Sl,000 and $200 10 purchase; 
additioual departments can be added to either system for SIOO at 
the time of purchase and SI 20 at a later point in time.' The unit 
processing costs for the two systems are S0.01 and SO.LO per 
docun~nt respectively. A depanmem that changes its system in 
the second period incurs a switching cost of $40. Note that, if a 
dcparunent chooses System I in a period subsequent to the period 
during which System 1 is initially brought into the organization, 
rather than sharing equally in the purchase p(ice with the other 
depanment, they incur only the delayed purchase cost of Sl20 
plus the switching costs of S40. Depanmems A and B process 
20,000 and 2000 documents per period respectively. The 
organizational policy for cost-sharing of joint purchases dictates 
that the two departments must share costs equally. With a bigb 
processing volume, A always picks system 1 beeause of its lower 
unit processing cost. Now consider the behavior of B. It can use 
either system I or 2. in either oftbe two periods, resulting in four 
potential strategies. The costs of these strategies are summarized 
in TablG 3; costs ofb01h periods are included. For instance, when 
Buses the (2, I) strategy, in which it pie.ks system 2 in period 1 
and system l in period 2, the costs are calculated as follows: B's 
101al cost of S580 comprises a first period cost of S400 (S200 in 
purchase COS\ and S200 in processing cost) and a second period 
COSI of S 180 (S40 in switching cost, S 120 in delayed purchase 
cost. $20 in processing cost). 
Both depar11llents 
select System I 
Both departments select 
identical systems: 
Either System I or System 2 
Both departments 
select System 2 
Processing volume of Department A 
Figure 3. Varying Choices with Processing Volume Changes. 
In region (I), depanmenl A selecis System I and depanmen1 B 
selects System 2: the choices arc reversed in region cm. 
Table 3. Summary of Costs: Two Period Analysis 
B's Strate= Costs with no subsidv Subsidv of SI0 from A 10 B 
DeotA n-n1B n.,,aniz.ation OcotA nent B Or•aniz.ation 
n.n 950 590 1,540 960 580 1,540 
fl,2) 950 1.010 1,960 960 1,000 1,960 
(2,1) 1,400 580 1,980 1,400 580 1.980 
(2.2\ 1,400 600 2,000 1,400 600 2.000 
Based on these coslS (wilh no subsidy), B chooses lhe stra1egy 
(2,1). This strategy gives i1 lhe least cost, which is SI0 cheaper 
than the next beSI Strategy (1,1). The IOlal Cost 10 lhe 
organization, the sum of cosis faced by lhe 1wo depanments in 
bolh periods, is Sl,980. If the organization can force B to use 
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S)'SlCm I in lhe lirsl period, the IO!al COS( 10 lhc organization will 
be SI ,540. If the organization permits B 10 delay its purchase, 
lhen lheorganization incurs rut extra cos1 or $440 while B saves 
SI 0. We 1erm this non-coopera1ive gaming behavior by 
depanmenls shadow-rider behavior 10 reflect lhe combination 
of free-rider and delayed purcilase behavior; it results in a dead-
weight Joss for the organization. Table 3 also shows the cost 
strueture when A makes a cross-subsidy payment of S10 10 B. 
With Ibis subsidy, depanment B is indifferent between picking 
(1,1) and (2,1). Assuming it picks (1,1), this results in a net 
saving of $440 (S1,400 · 5960) to A and the organization. As 
switching costs decrease, the organization's Joss due 10 shadow-
rider behavior decreases. but the subsidy required 10 coerce B 
increases. 
We model this behavior by extending lhe previous analysis 10 two 
periods. The departments choose a system in each period. They 
may switch systems in the second period and incur lhe cost of 
purchasing a new s~em, which may just be the cost of extending 
the site license acquired by another depanment. They also incur 
a switching cost lhat includes the cost of retraining and the coo 
o{ data and software conversion. Refer to our working paper 
(Dewan. Scidmann and Sundaresan 1995) for details of lhe model 
and analysis. Under cenain conditions, one depanmen1 may 
intentionally choose a different system in period I and switch over 
10 lheolher department's system in periOd 2. Thedepanmem will 
DOl pick lhecommon standard in the first period itself because 
i1 wants to avoid paying large acquisition CO$ts; ii does not 
cootinue with the disparate s~em in lhe second period as it wants 
10 cnjoylhe benefits of the standard system. The cost savings of 
adopting a system after some other depanmcn1 has acquired it 
(typical of site licensing) are large enough 10 overcome th~ 
incorqlalibility cost of choosing a diJierent system in period I and 
lhe switching costs in period 2. This dysfunctional shadow-rider 
behavior imposes additional costs on lhe organization. 
SC\-.:ral Other cltanging scenarios provide interesting insights into 
what can happen over longer periods. New and revised versions 
of sysierns continually emerge that change lheir functionality and 
maysubstantiallychange the acquisition, processing, translation 
and switching costs. Vendors maintain backward compatibility 
of systems 10 ensure that switching to lhe new version i.s easy. 
Competing s~ems (Lows and Excel) build features to translate 
documents from a rival system easily and may not provide a link 
the other way. This reduces translation and switching cos1s from 
competing systems. 
Uncertainty about lhe functionality of updates may mean that it 
is bater for an organization 10 ha.e two depanments use different 
systems rather lhan switching to a standard prematurely. 1l1e 
staodard literature is replete with examples of inferior standards 
being adopted prematurely (e.g., the QWERTY keyboard). 
Having two systems may be C011Sidcred a hedge against uncenain 
market changes, and the organization retains the option of 
swilChing over to a standard when bater information is available. 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORA TE 
IS STANDARDS POLICY 
We present a rigo.-ous analysis of the salient trade-offs associated 
with the strategic decision 10 adopt corporate standards. In 
general. a co~any may decide 10 mandate a cenain standard ( or 
a se1 of standards) 10 be used by all its business divisions. 
(Typical examples include various clinics and depanments in a 
hospital, different business divisions of a commercial bank, and 
different platlls and sites of a manufacturing corporation). A 
company can decide to force all users 10 use the same standard, 
but it may leave Ute actual choice of lhe particular standard to a 
negotiating process among users. Our results clearly indicate Uta1, 
under cenain realistic assumptions, users arc always better cif 
selecting Ute shared standard themselves. 
In some olher cases, the organization may 001 have a stated 
standards 1>0licy and still we show lhat all users will voluntarily 
select U1e same system. Such voluntary standards evolve under 
lhe following conditions: 
User needs are similar and lhcrefore all prefer identical 
systems. 
There is a high level of interaction among departments. 
Decision options available are so disparate Utat they result 
in very high translation costs among them. 
The scale economies in purchase of a standard system is 
significamly high. 
For an organization wiU1ou1 a set standards policy, a "best-of-
breed" solution, wherein each depanment independently picks 
a system U1a1 fits its needs best, is optimal for the organization 
overall _under the following conditions: 
105 
Each departments has a unique mission lhat is best supported 
by different systems. 
There is minimal traJlsfer of information amongdepanments. 
• It is very easy and inexpensive 10 translate data across 
systems. 
The discount on unifonn adoption is so small lhat the 
corporation finds it better to let departments stick 10 their 
preferred systems. 
The "best-of-breed" approach strategy may lead 10 disparate 
s:,,s1em installations by various departments. We identify in the 
paper interesting situations in which deparunents, staning wilh 
disparate S)~tems, will ,-otuntarily elect at a later poim in time to 
join a corporate standard. ·1oe main impetus for lhis move is 
driven by depanmeo1$ trying 10 cxploi1 corporate site licenses 
purcllased earlier by ocher departments. This sbadow-rid,ng 
bd,avi(lr is undesirable from an 0\-enll organizational standpoio1 
as It leads 10 net losses due to switching costs and redundant 
purcbases d sysiems later to be lbaodoord. 1bis coun1cr-
inluitive behavior bas been observed by 1he aulhors in numerous 
orpni2alions which lbey have visited o- the years. We show 
that cross-subsidy scbemes can avoid such dysfoncuonal 
behavior. 
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7. ENDNOTES 
I. This is a simplifying assumption. Allhougll we dlSCllSS the 
choice or standards in 1erms or dcparnnents in an 
organization, the argument applies 10 mdividuals wilhin a 
depanment just as well. 
Forexarrple, thea111hors of this paper incur a1n111Slation cost 
any time they receive a new version of Ibis jointly-wriuen 
paper from each other. One of the aulhor·s is using 
MicroSoft Word 6.0 on a Windows NT and sends it to 
another co-author who uses MicroSoft Word 5.1 on an Apple 
Macintosh. Tite recipient of the mail message (or of the 
floppy diskette) containing a draft of this paper bears the 
u-anslation and refmnatting cost whenever a new version of 
the paper is sent 10 him. The third co-author uses a Tex-
based system that imposes an even higher translation cost 
on the other co-authors. We found no way to conven the 
three figures among the systems. 
3. This assumption is made to analyze de jure standards. U it 
does not hold, !hen we have de /aero standards. This is 
examined in seclion 3.3. 
4. A cross-subsidy scheme may 001 be sufficient when there is 
a choice among more than two systems. For instance, if A 
prefers faccl and 8 prefers Lotus, but the organizationally 
optimal choice is Quauropro, lheo it may be necessary to 
subsidi,.c both A and B. 
5. We ignore the time value of money for simplicity. 
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